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Abstract
Increasingly hard-line and restrictive asylum policies and practices of many governments
call into question the scope of protections offered by the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees. Has the focus on the 1951 Convention been to the detriment and
subordination of other rights and standards of treatment owed to refugees and asylum-
seekers under international human rights law? Which standard applies in the event that
there is a clash or inconsistency between the two bodies of law? In analysing the interface
between international refugee law and international human rights law, this article looks at
the right to family life and the right to work. Through this examination, content and
meaning is offered to the almost forgotten component of the right ‘to enjoy’ asylum in
Article 14(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
1. Introduction
Increasingly, many western governments are implementing hard-line or
restrictive asylum policies and practices in order to deter and to prevent
asylum-seekers from seeking refuge on their territory, including by inter-
ception and interdiction measures, visa controls, carrier sanctions, ‘safe
third country’ arrangements, administrative detention, and/or restrictive
interpretations of the refugee definition.1 ‘Increased detention, reduced
welfare benefits and severe curtailment of self-sufficiency possibilities,
coupled with restricted family reunification rights, have all been manifes-
tations of this trend.’2 The application of deterrence measures has more
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recently been extended in some countries to recognised refugees,
principally through the erosion of standards of treatment, including the
‘denial of some of the important social, economic and cultural rights
guaranteed by the 1951 Convention [relating to the Status of Refugees
(‘1951 Convention’3)]’4 and other rights guaranteed under international
human rights law (‘IHRL’). In many developing countries, refugees are
denied basic rights, often due to ‘a sheer lack of resources’.5 To this end, a
‘disproportionate amount of energy and resources tends to be focused on
determining who is a refugee’,6 rather than on their treatment pre- and
post- recognition. ‘Xenophobia and intolerance towards foreigners and
in particular towards refugees and asylum-seekers have also increased in
recent years’7 and contribute to a hostile local environment in which
reduced standards of treatment are tolerated or even seen as acceptable.
‘Although the vast majority of States have ratified the 1951 Convention/
1967 Protocol, its application varies enormously, depending on the
national, cultural, economic and social situation.’8 ‘Clearly, the treatment
of non-nationals is an area of persistent, serious and systematic human
rights violations on a world scale.’9
Some governments justify their policies in light of 1951 Convention
provisions, without further reference to other applicable human rights
and humanitarian instruments.10 Keeping international refugee law (‘IRL’)
distinct from IHRL has played into the hands of governments choosing to
flout minimum standards. Although reference to IHRL has gained mom-
entum in refugee discourse in recent years, not least due to the work of
academic commentators and advocates in this field, its focus in inter-
governmental exchanges remains primarily located in the root causes of
refugee flight, rather than in the deprivation of rights by host country
practices. That is, the relevance of IHRL is most commonly seen as an issue
for the country of origin, rather than also for the country of destination.11
3
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8
C. D. de Jong, ‘The Legal Framework: The Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and
the Development of Law Half a Century Later’, 10 IJRL 688, at 691, (1998).
9
T. Clark, ‘Human Rights and Expulsion: Giving Content to the Concept of Asylum’, 4 IJRL 189,
at 193, (1992).
10
This article shall not consider obligations under international humanitarian law.
11
See, Thematic Compilation of General Assembly and Economic and Social Council
Resolutions — Human Rights and International Protection from 1981–2003, dated 1 Feb. 2003, at
211–217 for resolutions directed to human rights violations being the causes of mass displacement.
See, also, EXCOM Conclusions Nos. 73( XLIV ) of 1993; 80( XLVII ) of 1996; 85( XLIV ) of 1998,
paras. (g) and (h); and 87(L) of 1999, para. (a).
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For example, the Agenda for Protection, the so-called blueprint for future
refugee protection, ‘calls on States, intergovernmental organizations and
UNHCR to examine the root causes of refugee movements . . . and to
devote greater resources, both human and financial, in developing res-
pect for human rights, democratic values and good governance in refugee-
producing countries . . . ’12 (emphasis added). It does not address in any
comprehensive manner treatment of refugees or asylum-seekers in host
countries.
Although it is now the custom of the UNHCR to view refugee law as
part and parcel of the broader international human rights framework, as
seen in its first memorandum on human rights in 1997,13 it does not always
stress its obligatory nature, preferring merely to suggest that it offers help-
ful guidance to States in setting their own domestic standards.14 This
tentative approach is not altogether surprising given recent and recurring
questions by States parties as to the continuing relevance of the 1951
Convention.15 In fact, recourse to human rights law has evolved amid
such criticisms that the 1951 Convention is redundant or that it is ‘func-
tionally inefficient, overly legalistic, complex, and difficult to apply within
a world of competing [and changing] priorities . . . ’.16 Human rights
doctrine has frequently been resorted to in order to fill in the ‘grey
areas’17 of refugee protection, in particular, in giving fuller meaning to
the terms ‘persecution’ and ‘social group’ within the refugee definition,18 in
determining appropriate asylum procedures,19 and in ensuring protection
12
See, the Overview to the ‘Agenda for Protection’, UNHCR Executive Committee, 53rd session,
UN doc. A/AC.96/965/Add.1, 26 June 2002, at 11.
13
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principles related to refugee protection developed by the international community under the auspices
of the UN or of regional organisations.’
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15 For summary of criticisms of the 1951 Convention, see G. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Editorial: Asylum
2001— A Convention and A Purpose’ 13 IJRL 1–13 (2001).
16
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1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees’, UN doc. HRC/GIP/02/
02, 7 May 2002. See, also, K. Daley and N. Kelley, ‘Particular Social Group: A Human Rights Based
Approach in Canadian Jurisprudence’ 12 IJRL 148–174 (2000); A. Edwards, ‘Age and gender
dimensions in international refugee law’ and R. Haines, ‘Gender-Related Persecution’, in E. Feller,
V. Tu¨rk and F. Nicholson (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on
International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003), at 46–80 and 319–350 respectively.
19
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to those who fail the narrow definition of a ‘refugee’ in the 1951 Conven-
tion and/or 1967 Protocol but who nonetheless need protection against
refoulement.20
In the wake of the mass exodus of refugees fleeing Nazi, Fascist or
Quisling regimes during and after World War II, the newly established
United Nations General Assembly unanimously agreed the text of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 (‘UDHR’).21 Included
within this landmark declaration is Article 14(1), the springboard for the
subsequently concluded 1951 Convention. Article 14(1) provides that,
‘Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution in
other countries’. While considerable volumes of literature have focused on
the so-called right to asylum, usually seen as the right to access refuge or
‘to seek’ asylum, little has been written about the correlative right ‘to enjoy’
that asylum. In light of the increasingly restrictive asylum policies and
practices adopted by many governments, the scope and significance of
the latter deserves a full review.
While this article cannot hope to examine the concept in all its forms
and manifestations, it shall consider what is meant by the right ‘to enjoy’
asylum in terms of the standards of treatment owed to refugees and
asylum-seekers. The inter-relationship between international and regional
human rights law and refugee law is also explored. Understanding this
inter-relationship is essential to be able to identify fully the obligations of
countries of asylum vis a` vis refugees and asylum-seekers on their territory.
This ought to be the starting point of any determination of the applicable
standards of treatment for refugees and asylum-seekers, yet it is one that is
commonly overlooked. While it is now generally accepted that IHRL can
‘support, reinforce or supplement refugee law’,22 little attention has been
paid to the differing standards of treatment offered by the two bodies of
law in respect of particular rights and to which standard applies in the
event of an inconsistency or clash of provisions. Which standard takes
precedence where the 1951 Convention is either silent as to the appro-
priate standard or offers a lower standard than IHRL? Does specificity
override generality? Do subsequently assumed international obligations
replace earlier ones? Or does the higher standard apply? Part 2 of this
article is dedicated to conceptually understanding the interface between
IRL and IHRL, with some reference being made to international
treaty law. In addition, consideration is given to the origins and content
20
See, e.g., O.C. Okafor and P.L. Okoronkwo, ‘Re-configuring Non-refoulement? The Suresh Deci-
sion, ‘‘Security Relativism’’, and the International Human Rights Law Imperative’ 15 IJRL 30–67
(2003); B. Gorlick, ‘The convention and the committee against torture: a complementary protection
regime for refugees’ 11 IJRL 479–495 (1999).
21 UNGA Res. 217A (III), 10 Dec. 1948.
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E. Mason, ‘UNHCR, Human Rights and Refugees Collection and Dissemination of Sources’,
(1997) Int’l J. Legal Info. 35, at 40.
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of Article 14(1) of the UDHR. This article also briefly reviews the link
between standards of treatment and the search for durable solutions as a
component part of asylum.
Parts 3 and 4 take this analysis a step further by examining two separate
rights: the right to family life and the right to work. Both these rights
have been carefully selected as they are important rights for refugees and
asylum-seekers in their enjoyment of asylum, yet among the most con-
troversial. Compared to IHRL, the 1951 Convention is silent as to the
right to family life in its substantive provisions. Similarly, while the 1951
Convention includes a number of articles related to the right to work, the
rights are limited by status qualifications and are granted on the basis of
the standard of ‘most-favoured-nation’. Furthermore, these rights are
closely linked to the successful integration of refugees within host commu-
nities and the search for durable solutions. Thus, the two examples chosen
draw together the key issues addressed in Part 2 and attempt to give
meaning to the right ‘to enjoy’ asylum.
While noting the declaratory nature of refugee status, the term ‘asylum-
seeker’ is used in this article to refer to individuals who have not yet been
granted refugee status by the receiving State, whereas the term ‘refugee’
refers to those recognised as such under Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention, except where otherwise specified.
2. The human rights — refugee law interface
2.1 Conceptual narrative
‘The refugee protection regime . . . has its origins in general principles of
human rights.’23 The inclusion of ‘the right to seek and to enjoy asylum
from persecution’ in Article 14 of the UDHR alongside unanimously
agreed human rights and fundamental freedoms squarely places IRL
within the human rights paradigm. Moreover, reference in the Preamble
to the 1951 Convention to the 1945 UN Charter, the UDHR and ‘the
principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms
without discrimination’ confirms that IRL was not intended to be seen in
isolation from IHRL. The Preamble further notes that the UN has ‘man-
ifested its profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure
refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and
freedoms’. There is, however, no specific reference to asylum or refugees
in the UN Charter itself. Arguably such issues were considered to be
subsumed within the wider discussion on human rights and fundamental
freedoms at the time. It could hardly have been an oversight given the
post-World War II environment and the large-scale refugee flows which,
23
E. Feller, above n.2, at 582.
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amongst other factors, precipitated the creation of the UN. The inclusion
of Article 14 in the first declaration on the ‘human rights and fundamental
freedoms’, as referred to in the UN Charter, supports this analysis.
The subsequent drafting of a separate treaty on refugees was a prag-
matic response to the reality surrounding Europe after World War II. It
in no way removes the issue of refugees outside the realm of human rights.
At a minimum, Article 14 places the right to seek and to enjoy asylum
within the human rights paradigm and represents unanimous acceptance
by States of its fundamental importance. The Vienna Declaration on
Human Rights and Programme of Action similarly reaffirmed the right
to seek and to enjoy asylum in 1993.24 While States were adamant that
there should be no right to asylum in the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’),25 it is arguable that, whatever the inten-
tions of the States parties at the time, the right to seek and enjoy asylum is
implicit in the very existence of the 1951 Convention.26 The right to a
nationality in Article 15 of the UDHR was also not transferred to the
ICCPR, except in relation to children.27 Likewise, it is arguable that such
a right had already been secured by the 1954 Convention relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness.28
Moreover, regional instruments have clearly located the right to asylum
within IHRL29 and the UN General Assembly has consistently called on
States to respect the rights of refugees.30 Human rights treaty monitor-
ing mechanisms have not distinguished between refugees, asylum-seekers
or other individuals alleging an infringement of human rights on the
territory of a State party. In fact, refugees and asylum-seekers are increas-
ingly resorting to human rights mechanisms in the absence of a comple-
mentary apparatus under the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
24
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN World Conference on Human Rights, 1993,
UN doc. A/CONF.157/23, 12 July 1993, para. 23.
25
UNGA Res. 2200 A (XXI), 16 Dec. 1966; entered into force 23 Mar. 1976.
26
Cf. R.K. Goldman and S.M. Martin, ‘International Legal Standards Relating to the Rights of
Aliens and Refugees and United States Immigration Law’, (1983) 5(3) HRQ 302, at 309–310. The lack
of inclusion of a ‘right to asylum’ in the ICCPR has meant however that, in the absence of any
monitoring bodies in relation to refugee law, the Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) has been
prevented from considering what may amount to ‘fair procedure’ for refugees, see VMRB v. Canada,
HRC Communication No. 236/1987, 18 July 1998. See, also, M. Alexander, above n.19.
27
Art. 24(3).
28
360 UNTS 117, 28 Sept. 1954; entered into force on 6 June 1960 and UN doc. A/CONF.9/15,
30 Aug. 1961; entered into force on 13 Dec. 1975, respectively.
29
See, Art.22(9), 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Official Records, OEA/
Ser.K/XVI/I.I, entered into force 18 July 1978 (‘OAS Convention’); Art. 12.3, 1981 African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights, 21 ILM 59, entered into force 21 Oct. 1986 (‘African Charter’).
A notable exception is the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 5, 4 Nov. 1950, entered into force 3 Sept. 1953 (‘ECHR’), which
omits a right to asylum.
30 See, G.S. Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Language of Protection’, 1 IJRL 6 (1989), at 14–15 for an
overview of relevant GA resolutions.
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Protocol.31 Furthermore, EXCOM in 1997 ‘reiterate[d] . . . the obligation
to treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance with applicable human
rights and refugee law standards as set out in relevant international
instruments’.32 Most recently, States parties to the 1951 Convention
and/or its 1967 Protocol reaffirmed their commitment to ‘respect . . .
the rights and freedoms of refugees’ in a Declaration in December 2001.33
Conceptually, therefore, IRL and IHRL form part of the same legal
schema and tradition. At first glance, this may not appear to be a major
revelation. However, the isolation of IRL from developing human rights
norms and institutions has meant that refugees and asylum-seekers have
not always had recourse to the full range of rights to which they are
entitled. While the 1951 Convention incorporates a collection of impor-
tant rights, it is in no way comprehensive. Moreover, IHRL is especially
relevant with respect to non-State-parties to the 1951 Convention and/or
the 1967 Protocol that are otherwise parties to various human rights
instruments, as well as its role in developing international customary
rules that apply to all States.
2.2 The right to seek asylum
The origins of the ‘right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution in
other countries’ can be traced back to the ‘right of sanctuary’ in ancient
Greece, imperial Rome and early Christian civilisation.34 Its modern
equivalent was recognised by States in the form of Article 14 of the
UDHR. Notably, initial drafting proposals that incorporated a correlative
obligation ‘to grant asylum’ were not accepted.35 Based on enduring
31
606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 Oct. 1967). E.g. A v. Australia, HRC Communication No.
560/1993; Mutombo v. Switzerland, Committee against Torture (‘CAT’) Communication No. 13/1993;
Khan v. Pakistan, CAT Communication No. 15/1994; Ismail Alan v. Switzerland, CAT Communication
No. 21/1995; Aemei v. Switzerland, CAT Communication No. 34/1995; Tala v. Sweden, CAT Commu-
nication No. 43/1996; Pauline Muzonzo Paku Kisoki v. Sweden, CAT Communication No. 41/1996; Tapia
Paez v. Sweden, CAT Communication No. 39/1996; Korban v. Sweden, CAT Communication No. 88/
1997; Halil Haydin v. Sweden, CAT Communication No. 101/1997; Elmi v. Australia, CAT Commu-
nication No. 120/1998. See, also, ECHR jurisprudence in Soering v. United Kingdom, Ser. A 161, 7 July
1989; Chahal v. United Kingdom, Judgment 70/1995/576/662, 15 Nov. 1996; Ahmed v. Austria, Judgment
71/1995/577/663, 17 Dec. 1996; and Amuur v. France, Reports 1996-III, 25 June 1996.
32
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 82(XLVIII) on ‘Safeguarding Asylum’, 1997, para. (d)(vi).
See, also, EXCOM Conclusions Nos. 19(XXXI) of 1980, para. (e); 22(XXXII) of 1981, para. B; and
36(XXXVI) of 1985, para. (f ).
33 Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol, above n.14,
Operative para. 2.
34 R.K. Goldman and S.M. Martin, above n.26, at 309.
35
R. Plender and N. Mole, ‘Beyond the Geneva Convention: constructing a de facto right of asylum
from international human rights instruments’, in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey (eds.), Refugee Rights and
Realities: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 81, at 81. Cf. OAS
Convention, above n.29, which provides in Art. 22(9) to the right ‘to seek and be granted asylum in a
foreign country’, and Art. 12.3 of the African Charter, above n.29, which states: ‘Every individual shall
have the right when persecuted to seek and obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws
of those countries and international conventions.’
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principles of State sovereignty, ‘[t]he right to grant asylum remains a right
of the State’.36 In today’s climate of heightened security concerns, argu-
ments revolving around State sovereignty are gaining renewed vigour
as the ultimate right of States to patrol their borders and to reject
asylum-seekers at their frontiers.
The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum,37 the outcome of various
failed attempts to agree a binding treaty, reiterates that the granting of
asylum is an ‘exercise of [State] sovereignty’,38 yet it reaffirms that the
discretion of States in this regard is curtailed by the insertion of Article 3(1).
This clause reads: ‘No person [entitled to invoke Article 14 of the UDHR]
shall be subjected to such measures as rejection at the frontier or, if he
[or she] has already entered the territory in which he [or she] seeks asylum,
expulsion or compulsory return to any State where he [or she] may be
subjected to persecution.’39 While ‘States . . . retain, and jealously guard,
the right to admit or to exclude aliens from their territory’,40 ‘the notions
[of ] entry and presence are not the ‘‘very essence’’ of state sovereignty’.41
In fact, as far as the question of sovereignty and the institution of asylum
are concerned, the latter has more often been analysed from the point of
view that the act of receiving refugees should not be seen as an interference
with the refugee-producing country’s sovereignty, as opposed to an inter-
ference with the host State’s ability to admit non-nationals. Granting
asylum in this sense is a ‘lawful exercise of territorial sovereignty, not to
be regarded by any State as an unfriendly act’.42
In spite of these long-held and re-emerging arguments on State
sovereignty, some commentators assert that, although there is no right
to be ‘granted’ asylum de jure, there may exist an implied right to
asylum de facto,43 or, at the very least, a right to apply for it. They
argue that the discretion of States is not unfettered, being confined
by treaty and other rules.44 According to Joly, ‘ . . . [S]tates do not have
a completely free hand in deciding whom to admit with regard to
36
C. Harvey, ‘Taking Human Rights Seriously in the Asylum Context? A Perspective on the
Development of Law and Policy’, in F. Nicholson and P. Twomey (eds.), Current Issues in UK Asylum Law
and Policy, (Ashgate, Dartmouth, 1998) 213, at 221.
37
UNGA Res. 2312 (XXIX), 14 Dec. 1967. See, also, Report of the UN Conference on Territorial
Asylum, UN doc. A/CONF.78/12, 21 Apr. 1977.
38 Art. 1(1), 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, ibid.
39
Art. 3(1), 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, above n.37.
40
O. Andrysek, ‘Gaps in International Protection and the Potential for Redress through Individual
Complaints Procedures’, 9 IJRL 392, at 395, (1997).
41
L. Henkin, ‘An Agenda for the Next Century: The Myth and Mantra of State Sovereignty’,
(1994) Virginia J. Int’l L. 115, at 116.
42
G. Goodwin-Gill, ‘Editorial: Who to Protect, How . . . , and the Future?’, 9 IJRL 1, at 2, (1997).
43
See, T. Einarsen, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and the Notion of an Implied
Right to de facto Asylum’, 2 IJRL 361 (1990) and R. Plender and N. Mole, above n.35, at 364, for a
similar analysis in relation to the 1951 European Convention on Human Rights.
44
G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 1996,
reprinted 1998), at 202–203.
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refugees’.45 With the entry into force of the 1951 Convention, the right to
seek and to enjoy asylum was further elaborated. While the UDHR is
a non-binding instrument per se, arguably, as stated above, Article 14 is
implicit within the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol and is ‘an
important emerging norm of customary international law’.46 As the French
delegate concluded during the travaux pre´paratoires, the ‘right to asylum was
implicit in the Convention, even if it was not explicitly proclaimed therein,
for the very existence of refugees depended on it’.47 EXCOM Conclusion
No. 82 ‘reaffirms that the institution of asylum . . . derives directly from
the right to seek and enjoy asylum set out in Article 14(1)’.48
The right to seek asylum was reinforced by the inclusion of a specific
prohibition on refoulement in the 1951 Convention,49 including non-
rejection at the frontier.50 This prohibition has been buttressed by
IHRL, in particular Article 3 of the 1984 Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment
(‘CAT’).51 It is now largely agreed that the right against refoulement forms
part of customary international law.52 In addition, Articles 1 and 33 read
together place a duty on States parties to grant, at a minimum, access to
asylum procedures for the purpose of refugee status determination. Access
to asylum procedures is also debatably an implied right under the 1951
Convention (although such procedures are not necessary to accord refugee
protection), and is an accepted part of State practice. It has been asserted
that without appropriate asylum procedures, obligations of non-refoulement,
including rejection at the frontier, could be infringed.53 The right to seek
asylum is assisted by Article 13(2) of the UDHR, as reconfirmed in Article
45
D. Joly, Haven or Hell? Asylum Policies and Refugees in Europe, (St. Martin’s Press Inc., USA, 1996), at 1.
46
S.R. Chowdhury, above n.4, at 105.
47
G. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, above n.44, at 175.
48
Executive Committee Conclusion No. 82(XLVIII) on ‘Safeguarding Asylum’, 1997, para. (b).
49
Art. 33, 1951 Convention.
50
EXCOM Conclusion No. 22(XXXII), 1981, Part IIA, para. 2. See, also, Art. 3(1), 1967
Declaration on Territorial Asylum, above n.37.
51
HRC General Comment No. 20 (1992), para. 9, UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, 12 May 2003;
CAT General Comment No. 1 (1996), UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 6, 12 May 2003. See, also, Art. 3,
ECHR and its jurisprudence, including particularly, Soering, Chahal, and Ahmed, above n.31. See, also,
Art. II(3), OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa 1001
UNTS 45 (adopted on 10 Sept. 1969 and entered into force on 20 June 1974); Art. 5 of the OAS
Convention, above n.29. See, for further analysis, O. Andrysek, above n.40.
52
Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol, above n.14,
Preambular para. 4. See, also, UNHCR, ‘Summary Conclusions on Non-Refoulement’, Global
Consultations on International Protection, Lisbon Expert Roundtable 3–4 May 2001, organised by
the UNHCR and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C. During the
drafting of the Declaration of States parties, one of the only dissenting countries to recognising non-
refoulement as part of custom was the US. See, also, E. Lauterpacht and D. Bethlehem, ‘The scope and
content of the principle of non-refoulement: Opinion’, in E. Feller, V. Tu¨rk and F. Nicholson (eds.),
Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection (Cambridge
University Press, 2003), at 87–177.
53 C. D. de Jong, above n.8, at 689 and A. Edwards, ‘Tampering with Refugee Protection: The
Case of Australia’, 15 IJRL 192, at 197, (2003).
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12(2) of the ICCPR, which provides that ‘Everyone has the right to leave
any country, including his own . . . ’. The right to leave any country and
the right to seek asylum are two sides of the same coin in the refugee
context. Although Article 13(2) of the UDHR does not mention a right ‘to
enter any country’,54 it would make a nonsense of the 1951 Convention if
this was not intended, at least for the purposes of refugee status determina-
tion, especially where an individual has reached a country’s territory,
such as its territorial seas or a waiting zone in an international airport.55
Furthermore, Article 32 of the 1951 Convention prevents expulsion of a
recognised refugee ‘save on grounds of national security or public order’.
Article 13 of the ICCPR also refers to expulsion of aliens, although it
‘regulates only the procedure and not the substantive grounds for expul-
sion’.56 In particular, it provides aliens with full opportunity to pursue
remedies against expulsion, which may only be suspended for ‘compelling
reasons of national security’.57
2.3 The right to enjoy asylum
Apart from offering a definition of a ‘refugee’ in Article 1, the 1951
Convention enumerates a range of rights owed to refugees in Articles 3
to 34. The 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol ‘clarify the mini-
mum standards implicit in the application of Article 14 of the Universal
Declaration . . . ’.58 In line with the object and purpose of the 1951
Convention, by virtue of a positive refugee status determination under
Article 1A(2), States are bound to grant to refugees minimum standards of
treatment contained therein. By doing so, a framework for the treatment
of refugees and asylum-seekers in host countries has developed and the
right to enjoy asylum has been transformed from an initially vague concept
of temporary admission or stay59 to one requiring host States to adhere
to particular practices. The replacement of a right ‘to be granted’ asylum
with a right ‘to enjoy’ asylum changed the tone and ramifications of the
provision. In contrast to the right to seek asylum, the right to enjoy asylum
suggests at a minimum a right ‘to benefit from’ asylum. While a State is not
obligated to grant asylum, an individual, once admitted to the territory, is
entitled ‘to enjoy’ it. According to a UN report, ‘asylum’ consists of several
elements: to admit a person to the territory of a State, to allow the person
54
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55
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applicable.
56 HRC General Comment No. 15 on ‘The Position of Aliens under the Covenant’, UN doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, 19 May 1989, para. 10.
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to remain there, to refuse to expel, to refuse to extradite and not to
prosecute, punish or otherwise restrict the person’s liberty.60 The writer
argues that it goes further than this by virtue of Articles 3 to 34 of the 1951
Convention,61 as well as subsequent developments in IHRL. Thus, ‘[t]he
right to seek and enjoy asylum is not an empty phrase’.62
While there is no doubt that the 1951 Convention is the ‘foundation of
the international system of refugee protection’63 and that it remains
relevant over fifty years after its adoption, it is not the sole repository of
rights applicable to refugees and asylum-seekers. The rights enumerated
in the 1951 Convention are limited guarantees for refugees and asylum-
seekers and are not the range of rights available to them under IHRL. It
ought to be acknowledged, however, that the 1951 Convention pre-dates
the human rights covenants of the 1960s and incorporated a range of
rights that have been further enhanced by developments in human rights
law. The 1951 Convention covers a number of civil and political, as well
as economic, social and cultural, rights. Specifically, it includes rights relat-
ed to freedom of religion (Art. 3), property (Art. 13), artistic rights and
industrial property (Art. 14), association (Art. 15), access to courts (Art. 16),
wage-earning employment (Art. 17), self-employment (Art. 18), recogni-
tion of professional diplomas (Art. 19), and welfare, social security and
education (Arts. 20 to 24). However, IRL is structured in such a way that
‘ . . . gradations of treatment allowed by the Convention depend on notions
such as lawfully staying, or merely present in the territory . . . ’64 as well as
a sliding scale of standards of treatment as favourable as nationals65 to
treatment accorded to foreign nationals or aliens.66 The reciprocity phi-
losophy of the 1951 Convention67 can also act as a barrier to equal rights
with nationals. Goodwin-Gill distinguishes four general categories on
which the extent of a refugee’s rights may be determined, namely ‘simple
presence’, ‘lawful presence’, ‘lawful residence’, and ‘habitual residence’.68
Very few rights included in the 1951 Convention overtly apply to asylum-
seekers. Articles 31 (non-penalisation) and 33 (non-refoulement) are two such
60
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rights.69 According to the UNHCR, the ‘gradations of treatment allowed
by the Convention . . . serve as a useful yardstick in the context of
defining reception standards for asylum-seekers. At a minimum, the
1951 Convention provisions that are not linked to lawful stay or residence
would apply to asylum-seekers in so far as they relate to humane treatment
and respect for basic human rights’.70 Most other rights are contingent
upon status as a refugee. Given the declaratory nature of refugee status,
they may also apply to asylum-seekers,71 although this is not fully accepted
by States. IHRL, in contrast, embodies a large number of rights relevant to
refugees, including rights not mentioned in the 1951 Convention.
2.4 ‘Human’ rights and refugees
In determining applicable standards of treatment, the two key questions
for refugees and asylum-seekers are: Do human rights standards apply to
them? Which right prevails in the event of a conflict? One of the principal
purposes of the UN is to promote and encourage ‘respect for the human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion’.72 The human rights provisions of the UN
Charter are directly binding on Member States.73 Similarly, the UDHR
provides that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’74
(emphasis added) and that ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status’75 (emphasis added). Although
the UDHR is non-binding per se, it set the scene for the future elaboration
of human rights standards which do not generally distinguish between
nationals and non-nationals. In particular, these articles were later trans-
ferred to Article 2(1) of the ICCPR and Article 2(2) of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’).76
Thus, IHRL has as its point of departure the principles of non-
discrimination and equality. Basic human rights norms recognise
that ‘[n]on-discrimination, together with equality before the law and
equal protection of the law without any discrimination, constitutes a
basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights’.77
69
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The non-discriminatory basis of IHRL supports the view that such rights
are applicable to ‘all individuals within [a State’s] territory and subject to
its jurisdiction’.78 In this sense, IHRL is territory-based, not nationality-
based, except where it is otherwise explicit in particular provisions.79
Applying the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the fact that IHRL
does not differentiate between nationals and non-nationals except in a few
specific instances implies that aliens are included in all other provisions.
‘Thus the general rule is that each one of the rights of the [ICCPR and the
ICESCR] must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens
and aliens.’80 Although ‘nationality’ is not specifically referenced in the
non-discrimination clauses in either the ICCPR or the ICESCR, ‘national
origin’ or ‘other status’ would clearly protect discrimination against refu-
gees and asylum-seekers. In any event, Articles 2(1) and 2(2) of the ICCPR
and ICESCR respectively are non-exhaustive and prohibit ‘discrimination
of any kind’. Article 26 of the ICCPR, as ‘a free-standing guarantee of
non-discrimination in relation to all rights’,81 has further been utilised to
ensure protection of various rights, including economic ones.82
Thus, while asylum has long been ‘rarely defined or placed in context,
and often unattainable’,83 IHRL is a tool already available to give it
supplementary meaning. After all, ‘[r]efugees are people too’.84
2.5 A clash of standards?
While it is clear that IHRL applies to refugees and asylum-seekers,
the question remains what happens in the event of a clash of standards
between the two bodies of law? Article 5 of the 1951 Convention states that
‘[n]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and
benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Con-
vention’. The travaux pre´paratoires relating to Article 5 indicate that it was
inserted as an attempt to safeguard more generous practices of some States
that had been assumed voluntarily at the time of drafting. Although
Article 5 is written in the past tense, it is foreseeable that it was intended to
78
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equally apply to such practices that have taken on a legally binding char-
acter since then. That is, the 1951 Convention is subject to other, subse-
quently assumed obligations, either through treaty or custom. In this way,
it is asserted that later, more generous obligations assumed by States under
various human rights treaties that apply to ‘everyone’ and ‘all human
beings’ supplement and enhance their obligations under IRL and,
where there is an incompatibility, supersede them. If Article 5 of the
1951 Convention is read as a ‘successive clause’ or ‘conflict clause’, then
Article 30(2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(‘VCLT’)85 would support this interpretation.86 Although the VCLT is
not retroactive,87 it is now regularly applied as custom.88 It is also clear
that one of the intentions of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries was to
assure refugees the ‘widest possible exercise of their fundamental rights
and freedoms’.89 Subsequent EXCOM Conclusions have endorsed this
objective. Thus, the higher standard must prevail.
Having said this, it ought to be acknowledged that Article 5 is not
entirely unambiguous. If it is considered that Article 5 does not fully
clarify the issue of successive treaties specifically, sub-articles 30(3) and
(4) of the VCLT may offer useful guidance. They provide that where an
earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended, the former applies only to the
extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty.
While there is no refugee-specific replacement for the 1951 Convention,
there is an overlap in relation to particular provisions. As stated above, the
1951 Convention is a rights-based and rights-granting instrument. Its
coverage in Articles 3 to 34 is of the same nature as some rights granted
under various human rights instruments. An application of sub-articles
30(3) and (4) of the VCLT would mean that all the provisions of the 1951
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol remain on foot apart from those which
are incompatible with IHRL instruments subsequently ratified. That is,
85
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where an earlier treaty outlines particular standards of treatment that are
incompatible with a subsequent treaty, the latter prevails. An example
would be earlier provisions that are more circumscribed or less generous
than those of a later treaty. Conversely, where the earlier treaty offers a
higher standard for a specifically-defined group of individuals, it would
remain valid as representing an exception to a later treaty, unless otherwise
provided for in the treaty itself. A good faith application of the IRL and
IHRL, with due regard to their objects and purposes further requires that
this is the appropriate interpretation.90
2.6 Durable solutions
To take the above analysis to its logical conclusion, it would be an over-
sight not to mention briefly the clear link between standards of treatment
in host countries for refugees and asylum-seekers and the realisation of
durable solutions, including, particularly, opportunities for local integra-
tion. At the time of the drafting of the 1951 Convention, there was wide-
spread recognition by States that local integration was a real solution to the
plight of refugees.91 In fact, historically, local integration was the preferred
durable solution and repatriation was actively discouraged, as most of
the refugees originated from communist countries.92 The emphasis on
voluntary repatriation as the ‘primary’ solution only arose at the end of
the Cold War.93
Moreover, assimilation and naturalization are mentioned in Article 34
of the 1951 Convention and although framed in discretionary language,
calling on States ‘as far as possible to facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees’, they represent the natural end point of long-
term stay in the country of asylum. The granting of citizenship is the final,
not the only, form of local integration. In fact, it is the formalisation of the
local integration solution. The right to family life and the right to work, for
example, are also part of the local integration continuum. UNHCR has
recently separated this process into ‘self-reliance’ and ‘local integration’,
with the latter being the ‘end product of a multifaceted and ongoing
process, of which [the former] is but one part’.94 The General Assembly
90
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has acknowledged that ‘the promotion of fundamental human rights
is essential to the achievement of self-sufficiency and family security for
refugees, as well as to the process of re-establishing the dignity of the
human person and realizing durable solutions to refugee problems’.95
Whether there is a right to a durable solution is another important issue,
yet it is outside the parameters of this discussion. What is relevant to this
analysis is the potential for the provisions of both the 1951 Convention and
relevant international human rights instruments to give content and
meaning to the concept of local integration, an important, albeit indirect,
component of Article 14(1) of the UDHR.
3. The right to family life
3.1 The refugee context
Family ties and life are significant facets in every society worldwide. For
refugees and asylum-seekers their family life is often faced with threats
to its survival and existence. ‘Refugees run multiple risks in the process of
fleeing from persecution, one of which is the very real risk of separation
from their families.’96 As in other areas of refugee policy, host States have
increasingly adopted restrictive measures, either through narrow defini-
tions of who constitutes a family, the imposition of immigration-type
criteria on reunification applications, such as length of residence, employ-
ment status, access to housing and/or earning capacity,97 or even bars to
family reunification until after a specified period of time has elapsed.98 The
UNHCR has referred to the ‘continuing disinclination of some States
to facilitate family reunification’.99 In addition, the negative impact
that other refugee policies, such as detention of asylum-seekers, has on
the right to family life is evident. ‘Even if in most [European] States family
reunification is ruled by legislative instruments, administrative regulations
are often used to complete legislation with practical aspects and can result
95
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in a tougher or more favourable implementation of the law.’100 For
example, administrative delays in determination procedures often com-
promise the protection of family life for asylum-seekers and refugees.
‘Despite recognition of the family unit, its significance and its need for
protection, obstacles to family reunification [and family formation with
foreign spouses] are deep-rooted and manifold.’101
This part shall consider four particular issues for refugee families:
family reunification; the ability to marry and to form a family with a foreign
spouse; deportation and/or expulsion; and detention. The first two issues
confront the fact that, apart from the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (‘CRC’),102 there is no right to enter and to reside in another country
for the purposes of family reunification. The latter two issues consider the
inter-linkage between the right to family life and other rights of refugees.
3.2 Family unity and the 1951 Convention
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries failed to include a substantive provi-
sion on the right to family life in the 1951 Convention. In fact, the first
pronouncement on the right to seek and to enjoy asylum from persecution
in Article 14 of the UDHR was classed as an individual right. Moreover,
the 1951 Convention refers to ‘the refugee’ in the singular, without any
mention of the refugee’s family. While no substantive provision was
included in the text of the 1951 Convention, the Final Act of the Con-
ference adopted a specific recommendation that ‘[c]onsider[ed] that
the unity of the family . . . is an essential right of the refugee’ and
‘[r]ecommend[ed] Governments to take the necessary measures for the
protection of the refugee’s family’ with a view to ensuring that the unity of
the family is maintained and for the protection of minors. This recom-
mendation was adopted upon the suggestion of the representative of the
Holy See who pointed out that although it was ‘an obvious proposition’
that refugee protection naturally implied the protection of their families, it
‘would be wise to include a specific reference’.103 Delegates agreed pro-
vided that such a recommendation ‘did not detract from the ‘‘categorical
view’’ of the preparatory ad hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless
Persons that ‘‘governments were under an obligation to take such action
in respect of the refugee’s family’’ ’.104 It also places the right to family life
in the refugee context within a broader human rights framework by
100
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reference to the language in the UDHR. UNHCR’s Handbook
further notes that although there is no explicit inclusion of the right to
family unity in the 1951 Convention, the first recommendation is
‘observed by the majority of States, whether or not [they are] parties to
the 1951 Convention or to the 1967 Protocol’.105 EXCOM has been
forthright in its reaffirmation of States’ obligations to take measures to
respect family unity and family reunion.106
In terms of substantive provisions, Article 12 of the 1951 Convention
relating to personal status provides that ‘[r]ights previously acquired by a
refugee and dependent on personal status, more particularly rights attaching to
marriage, shall be respected by the Contracting State, subject to compli-
ance, if this be necessary, with the formalities required by the laws of that
State, provided that the right in question is one which would have been
recognized by the law of that State had he [or she] not become a refugee’
(emphasis added). Although Article 12 does not specifically deal with the
issue of family unity (it deals with personal status) and it is limited to the
domestic law of each State, it may be a helpful, albeit not incontestable,
tool to reinforce arguments in favour of family unity, especially its focus on
recognising pre-existing rights attaching to marriage.
Furthermore, it is common practice for States to grant ‘derivative’ status
to family members of recognised refugees. This approach attests to the fact
that States view— including in relation to refugees— that the sanctity of
the family is paramount. It is also widely agreed that ‘[t]he object and
purpose of the 1951 Convention implies that its rights are in principle
extended to the family members of refugees’.107 It is, therefore, possible to
develop arguments that the right to family unity is an emerging right under
customary international law in the refugee context, at least in so far as States
recognise such rights when family members arrive together with the
principal applicant.
3.3 The right to family life under international human
rights law
There are myriad provisions that elaborate the right to family life under
IHRL, starting with Article 16(3) of the UDHR which provides that ‘the
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled
to protection by society and the State’. The importance of the family is
underlined by the inclusion of provisions in both the ICCPR and the
105
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ICESCR. Alongside the right to self-determination and equality/
non-discrimination,108 the right to family life is the only other right that
received double protection by virtue of its inclusion in both these instru-
ments. Article 17 of the ICCPR incorporates the right in the form of
a prohibition upon ‘arbitrary or unlawful interference with [one’s] . . .
family’. Furthermore, Article 23 adopts near identical wording as the
UDHR and Article 24 addresses ‘the protection of the rights of the child,
as such or as a member of a family’.109 In contrast, Article 10 of the
ICESCR utilises more discretionary, albeit broadly conceived, language in
stating that ‘[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be
accorded to the family’ (emphasis added). In adding ‘assistance’ as a
component of the right, it reiterates the positive obligations on States.
Additional protections of the family have been included in the CRC,
including express provisions relevant to the protection of refugee
children.110 As with the ICCPR and the ICESCR, the rights enumerated
under the CRC are to be applied ‘without discrimination of any kind’.111
Thus, there is a wide array of human rights instruments available to create
a robust system of protection and assistance for the family. The right to
family life has also been recognised by regional instruments112 and in the
domestic constitutions of a number of countries.113 It is fair to say that
legally the right to family life is far better protected under IHRL than
under IRL.
Unfortunately, however, ‘there [remains] no unified approach regard-
ing a right to family unity or what family protection encompasses’.114
In fact, the terminology differs between the various instruments, starting
with the ‘family’ in the UDHR, ICCPR and the ICESCR, ‘family life’ in
the 1950 European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’), ‘family environment’ in the
CRC and the 1989 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child, and ‘family unity’ in the IRL context.115 In much scholarly litera-
ture, the right to family or to family life is treated synonymously with the
right to family unity. The writer considers that family unity is a subset or
characteristic of having a family life. For many refugee families, in order to
enjoy a family life, the unity of the family is their critical concern. This may
108
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require ‘not only that States refrain from action which would result in
family separations, but also that they take measures to maintain the unity
of the family and reunite family members who have been separated’.116
The fact that there is no right to enter, reside or immigrate, or to be
granted asylum, in international law poses a direct conflict with the right
to family life in two particular instances: (a) where family members are
separated during refugee flight, or (b) where a recognised refugee wishes to
marry a foreign spouse in order to found a family. The approach taken by
most States in carefully guarding the admission of non-nationals onto their
territory can be seen as an interference with an individual’s right to family
life. Some States also possess unreasonably cumbersome restrictions on
entry of refugee spouses of their own nationals.
IHRL refers not only to families already constituted, but expressly
protects the right to marriage and to form a family, that is, future families.
Article 16(1) of the UDHR provides that ‘[m]en and women of full age
without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to
marry and to found a family’. Similar wording is adopted in Article 23(3)
of the ICCPR, although ‘marriageable age’ is the preferred terminology.
Article 19(1) of the ICESCR calls for protection and assistance to the
family ‘particularly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the
care and education of dependent children’. In this context, ‘establishment’
is taken to mean ‘formation’.
3.4 The concept and definition of the family
‘Although international treaty law salutes the family as the basic unit upon
which society is organized, the family is still a concept in transition.’117 In
fact, there is no definition of ‘family’ under international law. The absence
of an agreed definition has meant that States may define the term accord-
ing to their own interests, culture and system. The UNHCR in its ‘Note
on International Protection’ in 2001 specifically highlighted the fact that
cultural discrepancies in definitions of the family have given rise to pro-
blems for family unity.118 Yet, it ought to be acknowledged that the lack of
a definition simultaneously allows scope for social and cultural variations
of the family to be recognised and accepted as legitimate under interna-
tional law. Along these lines, the Human Rights Committee has asserted
that the family is to be given a broad interpretation so as ‘to include all
those comprising the family as understood in the society of the State party
concerned’,119 subject to the fact that ‘a state party does not have exclusive
116
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jurisdiction in defining a family, because the definition has to be ‘‘without
discrimination’’ ’.120 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has
held that the ‘existence or non-existence of ‘‘family life’’ . . . is essentially a
question of fact depending upon the real existence in practice of close
personal ties’.121 The UNHCR also supports and promotes a broad
definition of the family, drawing on factors such as ‘emotional depen-
dency’.122 Some States have also accepted customary practices as influen-
cing decisions in relation to families.123 While this article cannot hope
to resolve this ongoing debate, it is recognised that the failure to agree a
definition of, or to elaborate guiding principles, on what constitutes a
family unit, has produced a dichotomy. On the one hand, this absence
has allowed States to circumvent their obligations under international
law, while on the other hand, it has given scope for the recognition of
culturally-influenced, as well as evolving forms, of the ‘family’ beyond the
Eurocentric ‘nuclear family’.
3.5 Family reunification
Apart from EXCOM Conclusions, which, although non-binding in a strict
legal sense, reflect the views of EXCOM Member States and in the
longer-term contribute to new customary practices, IRL offers little sub-
stantive guidance on the question of family reunification. Consistently, the
UNHCR has called on States to adopt liberal and generous policies with
respect to family reunification and promulgated similarly-oriented policy
guidance,124 albeit with mixed results. Guidance that is available tends
to appeal to States’ humanitarian sensibilities and compassion, rather than
to any strict legal obligations.125 More recently the UNHCR, through
its Global Consultations on International Protection, has drawn upon
120
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international human rights and humanitarian law to reinforce its policy
position on the reunification of refugee families.126
Although there is no explicitly worded right to family reunification in
international law, family unity is an essential component of the right to
family life. Without a unified family, there is often no family life.127 Family
reunification in this sense may be the only practical means of giving effect
to the right to family life in the case of separated refugee families. ‘Simi-
larly, the possibility to live together implies the adoption of appropriate
measures, both at the internal level and as the case may be, in cooperation
with other States, to ensure the unity or reunification of families, particu-
larly when their members are separated for political, economic or similar
reasons.’128 Thus, ‘the conclusion can be drawn that the admission of family
members of a resident alien protects the family unit. Therefore, if a right
should be recognised by States concerning the reunion of the family, it is
more a right to enter and to live in the country of reception or a right to the
protection of the family unit rather than a right to family reunification in
itself ’.129 The writer finds that due to the strict approaches taken by States
to the right to enter and to reside, the latter argument is more convincing.
Similarly, it can be strongly argued that ‘[r]efusal to allow family
reunification may be considered as an interference with the right to
family life or to family unity, especially where the family has no realistic
possibilities of enjoying that right elsewhere’.130 This so-called ‘elsewhere’
approach, largely developed by the European Court on Human Rights,131
offers support to the plight of refugee families, either those seeking reuni-
fication of separated family members or those facing deportation and/or
expulsion (see below). While this test has so far only been applied in
Council of Europe Member States and in the context of migration cases,
its potential applicability beyond these countries and cases is noteworthy.
As yet, the HRC has not had to address this issue. This approach could
resolve many of the obstacles to family reunification for refugees who by
their very nature are unable to enjoy the right to family life except in the
country of asylum. Having arisen in the context of immigration decisions,
it has been subject to valid criticism by some commentators132 and there
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have been pushes toward the adoption of a so-called ‘connections’ test,
that is, where a family can show that it has developed ‘ties’ to the host
community by, for example, having lived in the country for a considerable
time and/or founded a family there, they would be deemed to have good
reasons for not leaving.133 While this approach might also facilitate posi-
tive decision-making, it is an approach more favourable to migration
than refugee cases. The latter, for example, may be unable to demonstrate
sufficient ‘ties’ to the country of asylum, especially if they have not been in
the country for long or where their family members have yet to be
reunited. The Strasbourg Court would be encouraged not to discard the
‘elsewhere’ test in favour of a ‘connections’ test, but to accept the validity
of both approaches.
With respect to refugee children and family reunification, the CRC has
gone one step further than the ICCPR and the ICESCR by the inclusion
of specific articles addressing this issue. Being the most widely ratified
human rights instrument, the CRC offers substantial protection to refugee
children. Article 9(1) of the CRC states that, subject to express exceptions,
‘States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his
or her parents against their will’. Article 10(1) further provides that ‘In
accordance with the obligation of States Parties under article 9,
paragraph 1, applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or
leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt
with by States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner.’
Reading these two provisions together, there is a strong intimation that
where a child is separated from his or her parents against his or her will,
there is a correlative obligation on States to process any application for
family reunification in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. This is
more than simply an obligation to efficiently process an application for
family reunification as failing to grant reunification rights may bring a
State Party into breach of the earlier provision not to forcibly separate
children from their parents.134 States Parties may be seen as indirectly
contributing to the separation of a child from his or her parents by
delaying consideration of family reunification applications or denying
reunification without valid justifications. Moreover, doing so may breach
the cardinal principle of the CRC to act in the ‘best interests of the
child’.135 Article 22 of the CRC further notes that States parties shall co-
operate with the UN and other agencies ‘to trace the parents or other
members of the family of any refugee child in order to obtain information
necessary for reunification with his or her family’.136 While Article 22 does
133
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not provide that the reunification need be in the country of asylum, it is
arguable that upon an application of the ‘elsewhere’ test, this would be the
most obvious result. Even though States may justify delaying reunification
for asylum-seekers until after a positive asylum decision, it becomes unrea-
sonable the longer the delay, particularly for asylum-seeking children. If
the delay is unreasonably protracted, it might also constitute cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment.137
3.6 Family formation and marriage
Unlike family reunification, which has to be read into the right to family
life, there is an explicit right to marry and to form a family in Article 23(2)
of the ICCPR.138 Such a right applies irrespective of one’s status. ‘The
right to found a family implies, in principle, the possibility to procreate and
live together.’139 As stated above in relation to family reunification, States
have a responsibility to adopt appropriate measures in order to allow the
possibility of living together.140 Most States respect the right to marry and
to form a family for refugees living in their territory and wishing to marry
someone also living in that society. Difficulties arise where a refugee wishes
to marry and found a family with a foreign spouse not on the territory
of the State party. It is not uncommon for refugees to want to marry
individuals from their country of origin, due to their shared language,
culture or religion. The applicant may be part of a numerically small
ethnic, linguistic or cultural group within their host community, without
realistic possibilities for finding a compatible spouse. Such proposed mar-
riages raise questions of entry visas, documentation and potential fraud.
They may also encroach on issues of gender equality where the proposed
marriages are arranged or betrothals.
Whether the denial of entry of a foreign fiance´(e) amounts to an inter-
ference with the right to marry and to found a family has yet to be
judicially examined. According to the European Court of Human Rights,
the concept of family life could include ‘intended’ family life, that is, one’s
fiance´(e).141 The ‘elsewhere’ or ‘connections’ test applied in respect of
family reunification cases may prove relevant here also. For example,
where the applicant is part of a minority ethnic, religious or cultural
group in the host community, it might be unreasonable to expect that
he or she will find a suitable spouse in that community. That is, his or her
status as a refugee might suggest that without marrying a foreign spouse,
he or she will not be able to enjoy the right to marry or to form a family
‘elsewhere’. This will of course depend on the individual circumstances of
137
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the case, including in particular religious practices, customs and traditions.
Where the ‘intended’ spouse is known to the family before their departure
or arrangements for marriage were in place but were interrupted, it is also
arguable that entry and residence are required in order to effect the
marriage.
Where the foreign spouse is a resident or citizen of a country other
than the refugee’s country of origin, other factors arise. It would first be
necessary to determine if they could live in the country of residence or
citizenship of the intended spouse. It is not always the case that the country
of refuge is the most desirable location, although it would be important
that wherever the couple are granted the right to reside, the refugee is able
to maintain the level of protection required of his or her status as a refugee.
Considerations of the general situation in the country of destination,
including any hostility to refugees generally and/or persons of their ethnic,
religious, or cultural origin, would be relevant.
3.7 Deportation and/or expulsion
‘[G]iven the very serious consequences that the expulsion of refugees
may have, this should only be resorted to in exceptional circumstances
to protect national security or public order.’142 Expulsions that are not
pursued in the interests of national security or public order thereby breach
Article 32 of the 1951 Convention. Arguably, one of the ‘very serious
consequences’ is the break-up of the family unit and potential infringe-
ments of the right to family life. Article 13(1) of the ICCPR further spe-
cifies that, ‘except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise
require, [an alien lawfully in the territory of a State party] be allowed
to submit reasons against expulsion and to have his [or her] case reviewed
by . . . the competent authority . . . ’. Attempts by States to expel or deport
one member of an intact refugee family already in the country of asylum
can affect family unity. In such cases, the State must balance a number of
rights and considerations, which restrain its margin of action if it wishes
to separate a family.143 ‘[D]eportation or expulsion, could constitute an
interference with the right to family unity unless justified in accordance
with international standards.’144 It may violate a number of important
human rights provisions, including freedom from arbitrary or unlawful
interference with the family, the entitlement of the family to protection by
the State, and the right of the child to protection without discrimination.145
The European Court of Human Rights has applied a similar test to that
which it employed in family reunification cases in finding that ‘since it was
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de facto impossible for the applicant and his family to continue their life
together outside Denmark, [deporting the applicant] would be dis-
proportionate to the aims pursued and in violation of the right to
respect for family life’.146 While this case did not go as far as other
Strasbourg and Geneva jurisprudence in finding that removal or deporta-
tion may lead the deporting State into breach of other obligations by
returning an individual to a situation where his or her rights under the
ECHR may be infringed, such as under the torture provisions,147 it is open
to such an analysis. It might also be arguable that separating family
members by means of deportation or expulsion where that family has no
realistic possibilities of enjoying that right elsewhere could amount to
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, although this has
yet to be supported by case law,148 or infringe the ‘best interests of the
child’ principle underlying the CRC. Clearly, in cases where there are
serious reasons for the expulsion or deportation of the applicant, it raises
the issue of competing interests.
3.8 Detention
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has noted that, ‘[A]rticle
14 of the [ UDHR] guarantees the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution. If detention in the asylum country
results from exercising that right, such detention might be ‘‘arbitrary’’ ’.149
This article wishes to highlight briefly the issue of detention of refugees
and asylum-seekers as far as it impacts on family life. It is arguable that
the detention in separate facilities of refugee and asylum-seeking children
146
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from their parents or spouses from each other may amount to an arbitrary
interference with their rights to family life, in addition to their rights to
security of person and against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.150 Detention may also amount to a penalty under Article
31(1) of the 1951 Convention.151 UNHCR intermittently refers to the
impact of detention on family life in its Revised Guidelines on Detention of
Asylum-Seekers and Refugees, in particular stating that children and their
primary caregivers should not be detained unless this is the only means of
maintaining family unity.152 Even though the Human Rights Committee
has confirmed that detention of asylum-seekers is not per se in breach of
Article 9(1) of the ICCPR, nor is there any rule of customary international
law that would render all such detention arbitrary,153 it has stated that a
State party needs to demonstrate, in order to comply with Article 9, that
‘there were not less invasive means of achieving the same ends . . . ’.154
The Committee referred to reporting requirements, sureties or other
conditions which would take account of the author’s particular circum-
stances.155 These cases do not however refer to whether detention would
interfere with one’s family life.
For children, there are a number of relevant provisions in the CRC
which, taken singularly or in combination, would clearly find that deten-
tion of asylum-seeking or refugee children in separate facilities from their
parents to be in violation of the CRC.156 For adults separated from their
spouses, recourse is made to general family life provisions of the ICCPR
and the ICESCR. Even where children and their parents are housed
together in respect of the right to live together, conditions may be so
intolerable as to lead to family break-down and collapse. ‘There is a
growing body of evidence that prolonged detention of unspecified
duration, . . . can lead to serious, physical and psychological damage.’157
Thus, in some cases, detention can interfere, on a permanent basis,
with one’s right to family life. Little analysis has yet been given to this
aspect of detention by States parties, the UN or non-governmental
organisations.
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4. The right to work
4.1 The refugee context
‘[ I ]t has become clear that a significant proportion of the world’s refugees
[and asylum-seekers] is destined to remain in their countries of asylum for
long periods of time, due to the protracted nature of the conflicts which
have forced them to leave their homeland. It has become equally clear
that confining refugees to camps for years on end, deprived of the right to
freedom of movement and without access to educational and income-
generating opportunities, has many negative consequences.’158 A reluc-
tance to allow refugees and asylum-seekers to participate in the labour
market is commonplace in developing countries, largely born of ‘concern
about the negative economic . . . impact of large-scale refugee popula-
tions in countries which are struggling to meet the needs of their own
citizens’.159 Very few industrialised countries allow asylum-seekers to work
and there are still some restrictions on the right to work for recognised
refugees, including in Europe.160
The right to work is particularly important to refugees and asylum-
seekers as a means of survival and as a contribution to their sense of dignity
and self-worth. It provides them with an opportunity to participate in and
contribute to their host community, while improving language and other
skills. Economic independence reduces reliance on social assistance and
avoids the creation of an under-class of persons dependent on welfare.
UNHCR’s Handbook on Reception and Integration of Resettled Refu-
gees refers to the restoration of ‘social and economic independence’ as
among its principal integration objectives.161 EXCOM in 1988 ‘[r]ecognised
that the enhancement of basic economic and social rights, including
gainful employment, is essential to the achievement of self-sufficiency
and family security for refugees and is vital to the process . . . of realizing
durable solutions to refugee problems’.162 Whatever the ultimate durable
solution for individual refugees and asylum-seekers, access to the employ-
ment market facilitates all three of the identified solutions, whereas
languishing in camps, detention centres or in society indeterminately in
a state of economic dependence can only adversely affect their future
resettlement, local integration and/or return prospects.
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4.2 The right to work under the 1951 Convention
Among the economic rights protected under the 1951 Convention, Part III
regulates gainful employment: Article 17 refers to wage-earning employ-
ment, Article 18 to self-employment, and Article 19 to recognition of
professional diplomas. This article is concerned with Articles 17 and 18.
Refugees are not afforded the right to work on equal terms with
nationals under the 1951 Convention. At best, Article 17(3) calls on States
to give ‘sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all refugees
with regard to wage-earning employment to those of nationals’. Other-
wise, ‘[r]efugees [ lawfully staying in the territory] are given the equivalent
of a ‘‘most-favoured-nation’’ treatment’.163 The same standard is applied
in Article 18, except in so far as a refugee need only be ‘lawfully in’ the
territory of the State party. Moreover, any restrictive measures imposed on
non-nationals for the protection of the national labour market must not be
applied to refugees who (a) were already exempt from them at the date of
entry into force of the Convention for the Contracting State concerned or
(b) who have completed three years’ residence or (c) whose spouse or child
possess the nationality of the country of residence.164 Where the right to
work is granted, refugees lawfully staying shall be accorded the same
treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of general conditions of
employment.165
It has been suggested that not all rights are applicable upon the granting
of status, but rather depend on ‘lawful presence’, ‘lawful residence’ or
‘habitual residence’.166 The 1951 Convention is inconsistent in its drafting
of Articles 3 to 34 in this respect. In order to engage in wage-earning
employment on a most-favoured-nation basis, refugees must be ‘lawfully
staying’ in the territory of a State party, while to engage in self-
employment activities they must only be ‘lawfully in’ the territory of the
State party (that is, ‘lawfully present’). A literal interpretation of these
articles might highlight these semantic discrepancies, however, the object
and purpose of the 1951 Convention would suggest that, at a minimum,
the full spectrum of rights should be made available to refugees upon
recognition. Whether this amounts to temporary or permanent asylum is
irrelevant. Thus, it is arguable that any individual granted refugee status
is ‘lawfully present’ as well as ‘lawfully staying’ in the territory of a State
party. The text is insufficiently clear in both the French and English
versions to draw a contrary conclusion. It is also not readily apparent
why certain rights require higher levels of legal status or longer periods of
163
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stay than others. Without interpretative guidance included within the
text of the 1951 Convention, the meaning of such terms is at best open
to speculation.
In respect of asylum-seekers, it has been argued by Hathaway that it
cannot be reasonably concluded that refugees who submit to a refugee
status determination procedure are not ‘lawfully present’.167 Moreover, it
has been asserted that the absence of a duty to verify refugee status ‘would
allow States to indefinitely deny refugees their Convention rights simply
by refusing to verify their status’.168 Grahl-Madsen finds that ‘lawful stay’
to be equivalent to ‘lawful presence’ that extends for a period of three
months or longer.169 Of course, this is an arbitrary and artificial time
frame and has no support in the wording of the 1951 Convention.
Hathaway finds that ‘lawfully staying’ is not related to a legal status at
all, but rather to the de facto circumstances of the refugee.170 Goodwin-Gill,
in contrast, finds that refugees lawfully staying ‘must show something more
than mere lawful presence’, such as ‘permanent, indefinite or unrestricted
or other residence status, recognition as a refugee, issue of a travel docu-
ment, [or] grant of re-entry visa’.171 The latter explanation is the most
restrictive and would in most cases exclude asylum-seekers. As can be seen,
there is no clear understanding of the so-called qualifications upon rights
contained in Articles 17 and 18, or other 1951 Convention rights. What is
clear though is that States parties have benefited from these drafting discre-
pancies in refusing to grant the full range of rights to recognised refugees
and correspondingly to deny such opportunities to asylum-seekers.
In addition to Articles 17 and 18, refugees and asylum-seekers may
benefit from other 1951 Convention provisions in order to reinforce their
social and economic rights. It is arguable that denying refugees and/or
asylum-seekers basic social and economic rights could constitute construc-
tive refoulement. Not only might the lack of social and economic rights in a
particular destination country threaten to deter individuals from seeking
asylum from persecution there, but it may act as a push factor in which
refugees and/or asylum-seekers, out of pure economic necessity, are forced
to return to a country in which their life or freedom could be threatened.
The same arguments could validly be put in respect of a denial of the right
to family life. Article 33 is broadly conceived in prohibiting the expulsion
or return of a refugee ‘in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened . . . ’ (emphasis
167
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added). EXCOM has resolved that States must observe ‘[i]n all cases the
fundamental principle of non-refoulement, including— non-rejection at the
frontier . . . scrupulously’.172 It is open to argue, therefore, that ‘in any
manner whatsoever’ could include indirect forms of refoulement in which
treatment in the country of refuge is so pitiable that it leaves refugees and
asylum-seekers vulnerable to move to another country or to return
home.173
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention may similarly be used in support
of economic rights. It requires that ‘Contracting States shall . . . not
impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees
who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was
threatened . . . , enter or are present in their territory without authorisa-
tion, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities
and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.’ As stated in Part 2
above, it is well accepted that this provision applies to asylum-seekers as
well as to refugees. While the term ‘penalties’ within the meaning of Article
31 has been most commonly interpreted in terms of ‘prosecution, fine and
imprisonment’, it is possible that the term has a broader meaning.174 The
Article has at its base the concept of non-penalisation for illegal entry
or presence. The Conference of Plenipotentiaries to the 1951 Convention
clearly intended that refugees not be penalised through recourse to crim-
inal prosecution for their illegal entry or presence, recognising that refu-
gees ‘may have good cause for leaving any first country of refuge’.175 They
may have also intended to protect refugees from the denial of certain
benefits or rights on account of their illegal entry or presence. Subsequent
conclusions of EXCOM have confirmed just this intention, in stating
that asylum-seekers should ‘not be penalised or exposed to any unfavourable
treatment solely on the ground that their presence in the country is con-
sidered unlawful’ (emphasis added).176 In the event that Article 31 is
applicable, any measures taken to penalise refugees by reason of their
illegal entry or presence, such as the denial of family rights or the right to
172
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work, need to be justified in the interests of national security or on the basis
of public order, as well as being proportionate to their intended pur-
pose.177 The requirement to implement their obligations in good faith
further requires that States justify their actions on the basis of at least one
of the above grounds.178
4.3 The right to work under the ICESCR
Before delving into what the right to work under the ICESCR constitutes,
it is first necessary to determine whether it applies to non-nationals. Given
the particular nature of economic rights, a separate analysis of this ques-
tion is required here in addition to the general principles outlined in Part 2
above. Article 6 of the ICESCR provides that, ‘Everyone has the right to
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his
[or her] living by work which he [or she] freely chooses or accepts . . . ’.
This was first recognised in Article 23 of the UDHR and later legally
entrenched in Article 6. There is no specific mention of the right to self-
employment in the ICESCR, as in the 1951 Convention, although it is
taken to be included within the broad wording of Article 6. In addition,
Article 7 of the ICESCR refers to standards of treatment in employment.
It is well-established that these standards apply to non-nationals on
an equal footing as nationals, although given the particular vulnerability
of refugees and asylum-seekers such standards are not always fully
observed.179 The 1951 Convention, as shown above, also provides for
equal employment standards for refugees as those enjoyed by nationals.
‘A plain reading of [Article 6] would certainly indicate that alien work-
ers are entitled to significant protection in any state in which they choose to
work.’180 Article 2(2) of the ICESCR reinforces its non-discriminatory
basis and Article 26 of the ICCPR extends non-discrimination protection
to socioeconomic rights of non-nationals.181 By and large, ‘more powerful
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claims can be advanced on behalf of asylum-seekers under international
human rights law’182 than under IRL. The Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has noted that reception standards of asylum-
seekers may be contrary to their right to an adequate standard of living
in Article 11(1).183 It further commented on Venezuela’s failure to issue
personal documentation to refugees and asylum-seekers and its negative
impact on their ability to exercise rights to work, health, and education. In
general, therefore, Article 6 applies to non-nationals, although it is subject
to a number of limiting factors.
First, Article 2(3) of the ICESCR specifically allows developing coun-
tries to limit the economic rights of non-nationals. It is not, however, an
unlimited discretion. Notably, Article 2(3) states that ‘[d]eveloping coun-
tries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may
determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights
recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals’. It is itself limited
by the words ‘human rights and the national economy’. While ambigu-
ously worded, its purpose was to end the domination of certain economic
groups of non-nationals during colonial times. For this reason, it ought to
be interpreted narrowly.184 It is open to read Article 2(3) as meaning that
where a distinction is made between a citizen and an alien in respect of a
basic economic right and such a distinction would have the effect of
undermining their other basic rights and their human dignity, such a
denial of that right would not be legitimate. For example, restrictions
imposed as a pretext for racial discrimination would not be acceptable,
nor would a prohibition on the right to work for refugees and asylum-
seekers where no social welfare assistance is provided in lieu thereof so as
to threaten their very existence. It may be generally justifiable to prohibit
tourists from engaging in employment, but not refugees and asylum-
seekers, as the latter are frequently in situations of vulnerability and may
require additional care on the part of the host State. Similarly, where a
restriction is not justified by the interests of the national economy, it is
likewise in breach of the Covenant. By way of illustration, ‘it can
perhaps be argued that economic constraints may justify limiting
some entitlements (such as welfare or heath care) to citizens, but limiting
employment-related benefits would not be supportable under this
182
R. Cholewinski, ‘Economic and social rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe’, above
n.163, at 713.
183
ICESCR Committee, Report on the 25th, 26th and 27th sessions (23 Apr. 11 May 2001, 13–30
Aug. 2001, 12–30 Nov. 2001), ECOSOC Official Records, Supp. No. 2, UN doc. E/2002/22,
E/C.12/2001/17.
184
See, Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, UN doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, Annex, para. 43.
185
J. Fredriksson, ‘Bridging the Gap between rights and responsibilities: Policy changes affecting
refugees and immigrants in the United States since 1996’, (Spring 2002) 14 Georgetown Immig. L.J. 757,
at 778.
Human Rights, Refugees, and The Right ‘To Enjoy’ Asylum 325
rationale’.185 According to Fredriksson, ‘It is unreasonable to deny both
the right to work and the right to access social security: this policy
threatens to deter bona fide asylees with a well-founded fear of persecution
from seeking protection . . . ’.186 It may also lead a host State into breach
of its other human rights obligations, such as Articles 6 and 7 of the
ICCPR. Many developing countries have taken advantage of Article 2(3)
in order to deny rights to refugees and asylum-seekers on their territory. In
some cases it is legitimate, while in others it is born of local politics and
pandering to anti-refugee sentiment. In order to determine the degree to
which IHRL is supplementary to IRL, it thus requires an analysis of the
particular circumstances in the country of asylum and the effect of such a
denial on the individual.
In light of the explicit, albeit limited, exception for developing States, it
can be implied that no distinctions can thus be drawn between nationals
and non-nationals in developed States, although some commentators have
argued that this position might be a difficult to maintain given the general
practice of States. Craven, however, has argued that ‘In so far as the
United Kingdom and France considered it necessary to rely upon reserva-
tions to modify their obligations under the Covenant, it might be assumed
that the Covenant otherwise prohibits discrimination against aliens with
respect to employment.’187
The second potentially limiting factor affecting the applicability of
Article 6 of the ICESCR is the concept of progressive realisation that
underlies much of the ICESCR. According to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR,
socioeconomic rights are to be implemented according ‘to the maximum
of [a State’s] available resources’.188 This has acted as a further practical
barrier - to the full realisation of the right to work for nationals and non-
nationals alike in many countries. ‘[W]hile non-nationals are clearly ben-
eficiaries of ICESCR rights, the exact treatment owed to them by States
Parties is not well defined.’189 According to the ICESCR Committee, ‘the
fact that realisation over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen
under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obliga-
tion of all meaningful content. . . . It thus imposes an obligation to move as
expeditiously and effectively as possible towards [the goal of the full
realisation of the rights in question]’.190 Importantly, the Committee has
highlighted that among the obligations which are of immediate effect is the
‘undertaking to guarantee that relevant rights will be exercised without
186
J. Fredriksson, ibid., at 778.
187
M.C.R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Perspective on its
Development, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), at 214.
188 Art. 2(1), ICESCR.
189
J.A. Dent, above n.167, at 45.
190
ICESCR Committee General Comment No. 3, 5th sess., 1990, 14 Dec. 1990, para. 9. See, also,
Limburg Principles, above n.184, para. 21.
326 Alice Edwards
discrimination’.191 The Committee has further noted that progressive
realisation is tempered by the insertion of a duty ‘to take steps’ which is
of immediate effect.192 In addition, the obligation of progressive achieve-
ment exists independently of an increase in resources; it requires effective
use of resources available.193
Third, Article 4 allows any form of limitation to ICESCR rights as is
determined by law ‘in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of
these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of
a democratic society’.194 As with Article 2(3), Article 4 has been carefully
drafted. It is not sufficiently broad as to allow complete scope to deny
economic rights to non-nationals without justification. Any restrictions
need to be ‘solely’ for the purpose of promoting the general welfare of a
democratic society. In so far as the denial of employment opportunities to
refugees and asylum-seekers is concerned, in many cases it could be
arguable that giving access to the labour market would itself promote the
general welfare of society, enhance understanding and build confidence
toward such groups, and generally contribute to their sense of self-worth
and dignity. In support of this, the ICESCR Committee has emphasised
that Article 4 ‘is primarily intended to be protective of the rights of
individuals rather than permissive of the imposition of limitations by the
State’.195
Overall, it can be successfully argued that the ‘right to work’ in principle
applies to nationals and non-nationals alike by virtue of a literal interpre-
tation of Article 6 and the non-discrimination basis of IHRL generally. It is
though subject to a number of limiting factors that need to be restrictively
interpreted and applied in light of the particular circumstances in the
country of asylum. In any event, the absence of residence requirements,
as in the 1951 Convention, means that IHRL is wider in its scope of
application, applying to refugees and asylum-seekers alike. The 1951
Convention, however, remains important in its assurance of employment
opportunities for some categories of recognised refugees.
Having outlined above that the right to work applies to non-nationals,
albeit subject to some limitations, the next issue is to determine what
the ‘right to work’ entails. The ICESCR Committee has stated that ‘a
minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction or, at the very least,
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every
State party’.196 Unfortunately, however, the Committee is yet to issue a
191
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specific General Comment on the right to work in order to identify its
‘minimum core content’. At the time of drafting Article 6, there was much
debate between socialist and market economy States as to the precise
obligations imposed on States. At a minimum, it is agreed that the ‘right
to work’, via the inclusion of the wording ‘opportunity to earn a living’, can
be interpreted as ‘implying that the State should restrain itself from
preventing persons from working’.197 (emphasis added) That is, there should
be access to the labour market. However, it does not necessarily extend to
a guarantee of employment.198 For refugees and asylum-seekers, the first
battle is often access to the labour market, which would be covered by any
minimum requirements of Article 6.
What is not reflected, however, in this legal analysis is the factual
situation of the continuing reluctance of States to recognise the equal
rights of refugees, asylum-seekers and other aliens to economic rights.
It is thus more a question of implementation than legal protection. Part
of this reluctance can be traced to the division of UDHR rights into two
separate instruments.199 Despite the fact that the UN has consistently
referred to the ‘universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated’
nature of all human rights,200 States continue to give unequal weight
to economic rights. General respect for economic rights, whether for
nationals or non-nationals, is the starting point for their equal application
to refugees and asylum-seekers.
5. Conclusion
There is no doubt that the 1951 Convention retains its ‘central place in the
international refugee protection regime’, as acknowledged by States par-
ties in the Declaration in December 2001.201 Yet it is similarly clear that
the 1951 Convention does not cover the many rights nor deal with the
range of issues facing forcibly displaced persons today. IRL suffers from
the fact that it is seen as a ‘compromise between the state imperative of
migration control and humanitarian concerns’.202 Its lack of a complaints
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procedure and the failure of the UNHCR to activate its supervisory role203
in new and dynamic ways, such as through state reporting requirements,
have, in addition, meant that the supervision of the rights of individual
refugees under IRL has fallen behind the momentum of IHRL. Given that
it is highly unlikely in the present political climate that States parties would
agree to any revision of the 1951 Convention in order to broaden its
protective scope, IHRL is an effective device available to strengthen and
to enhance existing standards.
With more frequent recourse being made to human rights redress
mechanisms by refugees and asylum-seekers themselves, the writer finds
that it is no longer possible to assert that refugee policy is ‘at least one part
State interest and at most one part compassion’.204 While States continue
to assert their sovereignty in relation to admitting aliens to their territory,
their corresponding accession to varying international instruments
binds them to certain standards in relation to the enjoyment of asylum.
A plethora of standards of treatment are prescribed by both IRL,
albeit subject to qualifications on status, and IHRL. The latter, although
imperfect in its formulation and subject to varying interpretations and
exceptions, bolsters the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers under inter-
national law and on some occasions goes beyond the protection offered by
refugee law. As this article has shown, the right to family life is a clear
example of the protections afforded to refugees under the 1951 Conven-
tion being inadequate. Similarly, the right to work is restricted under the
1951 Convention to the imprecise sub-categories of ‘refugees lawfully
staying’ or ‘lawfully in’ the territory of a State party and subject to
‘most-favoured-nation’ treatment. Although the IHRL regime suffers
from its own limitations in respect of economic rights, it is open to argue
that the right to work in the ICESCR applies to refugees and asylum-
seekers by virtue of its non-discriminatory provisions and upon a literal
interpretation of Article 6. Permissible restrictions are not as broad as
asserted by some States. The establishment of a complaints mechanism for
the ICESCR should, in the future, finally clarify some of the continuing
debates on the applicability of economic rights to non-nationals.205
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In the face of eroding standards of treatment for refugees and asylum-
seekers, IHRL serves to reinforce refugee protection and to define and
give meaning to the ‘right to enjoy asylum’ component of Article 14 of the
UDHR. In the event of an inconsistency between the two bodies of law,
the higher standard must prevail, not only because this is required by
treaty interpretation but also because of the underlying rationale behind
both IRL and IHRL to recognise ‘the inherent dignity and . . . the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the founda-
tion of freedom, justice and peace in the world’.206
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